Slightly more
than two decades
have passed since
the TPLF enshrined
ethnicity in the
laws and constitution of
the country as the foundation
as well as
the guiding principle
of statecraft and
interethnic
relations. The
experience gained during
this period of
our political history
is more than
adequate for assessing
the wisdom of
structuring government on
such an emotionally
charged, divisive and
unstable basis. It
provides as well
a window to
the likely consequences
of this form
of governance on
the future fate
of our common
citizenship (“Ethiopiawinnet”), interethnic harmony,
individual and minority
rights, and the
state’s
ability to enforce
the muchvaunted but
often ignored dictates
of the rule
of law.
The recent
expulsions of Ethiopians
of Amhara heritage
from Gura Ferda
and Beni-‐Shangul, the
confiscation of their
properties and the
crime of rape
and other forms
of victimization inflicted
upon them, are
not only a negation of
the forgoing values
but also unmistakable
harbingers of worse
forms of ethnic
oppression, discrimination, and
social conflict looming
on the horizon.
An unmistakable lesson
of these experiences
of mass atrocity
is that the
notion of an
undifferentiated citizenship holds
very little or
no sway in
the country any
longer, thereby condemning
ethnic minorities trapped
in the wrong
titular state to
the tender mercies
of the ethnic
elites in control
of these states
and the connivance
and manipulation of
the ruling elites
at the center.
If citizens who
do not belong
to the “right”
ethnic group can
be endangered with
impunity in this
way merely on
account of being
“different” from the
relevant majority, can
it be long
before the notion
of a common
citizenship gradually atrophies
and becomes extinct?
Even if
this particular result
can somehow be
avoided, the devolution
of political power
to ethnic majorities
will always put at risk
the security, status
and rights of
those who do
not belong to
the empowered regional
majorities. If, the
fundamental political constitutional issue
in Ethiopia is
how citizens of
varying ethnic and
cultural backgrounds can
coexist harmoniously, the
atrocities alluded to
above highlight another
sobering lesson: federalism,
by itself, is
not enough as
a means for
promoting ethnic harmony
or for protecting
individual rights. This
is because the
glorification of ethnic
identity under the
auspices of ethnic
federalism is fundamentally
and inherently incompatible
with the notion
of equal rights
and a common
citizenship. Consequently, the
most important immediate
political task for
all Ethiopians should
be to nourish
a countrywide sense
of identification and
belonging and to
tamp down the
rhetoric and obsessive
fascination with the socalled national
question that continues
to captivate and freeze otherwise
intelligent minds. I do realize
that this is
indeed a tall
order under the
prevailing political circumstances. But
if we are
to avoid the
two most tragic
consequences of ethnic
division and conflict
genocide and the
breakup of the
country there is
no other option
but to come
together in defense
of Ethiopiawinnet and
equal citizenship. The
danger exposed by
Gura Ferda and
Beni-‐Shangul
should serve as
a wake up call
to action.
In the
following pages, I will address
four questions that
the crimes committed
against Amharas in
Gura Ferda and
Beni-‐Shangul
raise. The first
question concerns the ideology
that motivates political
ethnicity and its underlying aims.
I will then
briefly note the
ways in which
the ruling party
in Ethiopia has
entrenched these aims
in the basic
law of the
country. This is
followed up by
a brief discussion
highlighting the particular
ways in which
the constitutionalization of
ethnicity objectively undermines
Ethiopiawinnet and basic
human rights as
internationally recognized. In
particular, these remarks will
highlight how this
constitutional formula is
likely to lead
to the most
odious forms of
human rights violations,
namely, ethnic cleansing
and genocide. I will conclude
by pointing out
that upholding Ethiopiawinnet holds
the key for
forestalling such tragedies
and for maintaining
social peace and
stability, and for
promoting democracy and
human rights.
Political Ethnicity
and Its Aims
Lurking behind
the politicization of
ethnic identity in
Ethiopia is a
pernicious ideology: the
ideology of ethnic
nationalism which the
Ethiopian Student Movement,
wittingly or unwittingly,
popularized under the
ill-‐conceived
rubric of the
“national question.” For
many, this slogan
signified nothing more
than a demand
for a policy
of ethnic equality
so as to
exorcise the cultural
milieu of ethnic
mistrust and antagonism
as well as
to encourage ethnic
groups to come
together, as Lenin
would have us
believe naively, as
it turned out.
But ethno-‐nationalist ideologues
and politicians are
rarely satisfied with
ethnic equality per
se; they demand
much more.
Ethnonationalism has
three defining characteristics that
reveal the chief
aims of political
ethnicity and the difficulty of
bringing ethnic groups
to come together
when politicians use
ethnicity as a
source of political
identity. As our
own experience demonstrates,
citizens who might
not have been
aware of their
ethnicity regrouped under
its banner as
soon as the
state deliberately used
it as a
source of identity.
Thus the first
characteristic of the
ideology of ethnic
nationalism is that
nations are to
be defined solely
in ethnic terms,
i.e., in terms
of a common
history, tradition, and
a common language.
Secondly, nations should
have their own
states, so that
the nation as
so defined and
the state should
be congruent with
each other. Finally,
the loyalty of
members of a
nation should override
all other loyalties
including loyalty to
an overarching countrywide
nationalism. Clearly, this
notion of nationalism
is at odds
with the citizen
nationalism which Ethiopiawinnet seeks
to uphold. Ethiopiawinnet holds
that all Ethiopians
are part of
the same nation
irrespective of their
ethnic background and
are united by
a patriotic attachment
to a common
country in which
all enjoy equal
rights.
But civic
nationalism has to
contend with the
dangers inherent in the ideology
that conceives ethnic
groups as “nations.” The
main danger inherent
in ethnonationalism is
threefold: expansionism, exclusivism
and secessionism. Expansionist
ethnic nationalism threatens
the territorial integrity
of states and
substates.
In the case
of Ethiopia, the
most obvious example
is the expansionism
of the TPLF
into Gondar and
Wollo provinces in
fulfillment of the
Greater Tigray project.
Ethnic nationalism
is also inherently
exclusivist and gives
rise to various
forms of ethnic
cleansing, as we
have witnessed in
Gura Ferda and
BeniShangul.
As one of
the most virulent
ethnonationalists,
Jawar Mohammed, has
told us Ethiopians
living in the so
called Oromia must
leave the region
or “else.” Some
may naïvely dismiss
or discount Jawar’s threat
captured in YouTube
as the outbursts
of a callow
young man. But
that would be
a mistake. It
behooves us to
remember that those
whose ideology demands
blind loyalty to
their own community
and its selfrighteous claims
of right, and
those who glorify
their own ethnic
group to the
denigration of others
are often those
who will have
no qualms to
engage in ethnic
cleansing and genocide
in the “name”
and the “defense”
of their ethnic
group. Entranced by
their ideology and
a sense of
a past victimization
that is often
rooted in halftruths and
utter lies, they
will have little
or no compunction
to deny the
humanity of those
whom they regard
as the “Other.”
Dyed in the wool
ethnonationalists
are secessionists to
the core as
well. The missionaries
of ethnic federalism
may indulge the
belief that their
chosen form of
governance will satisfy
the ethnonationalists’ desire
for selfgovernment and
thereby discourage secessionism. But
this is a
pious hope and
a dangerous illusion.
The devolution of
political power to
an ethnic majority
is more often
than not a
political arrangement that
risks fuelling the
ambitions of nationalist
leaders who will
be satisfied with
nothing short of
their own nationstate. Examples
of this abound:
Nagorno-Karabakh in
Azerbaijan, Abkhazian in
Georgia, Chechnya in
Russia, and the
Serbian region of
BosniaHerzegovina.
We should not be surprised
to see this
trajectory replicated in
Ethiopia in the
future, making the
country’s territorial
integrity always provisional
and contingent, its
politics messy and
unstable, and the
rights of individuals
belonging to ethnic
minorities precarious.
Ethnicity and
the EPRDF Constitution
The Ethiopian
Constitution is in
essence the expression
and implementation of
the TPLF’s ethnonationalist ideology.
What the constitution
enshrines is not the
idea of democracy
as a polity
of equal citizens,
but rather of
the creation of
a national state
for the local
majority, ethnically defined.
Article 8
unabashedly announces, “All
sovereign power resides
in the Nations,
Nationalities and Peoples
of Ethiopia” and
goes on to
provide that “This
constitution is an
expression of this
sovereignty.”
Article 8
sounds the death
knell of Ethiopia
as a sovereign
nation because it
locates sovereignty not
in all its
citizens as a
people acting in
their individual capacities
unimpeded by their
particular ethnic affiliations
but rather in
the various ethnic
communities that inhabit
the country. In
other words, by jettisoning the
notion of popular
sovereignty based on
“We the people”
in favor of
ethnic group sovereignty,
the constitution envisions
a state in
which each ethnic
group (at least
the major ones)
is privileged to
decide its own
form of governance,
identity, future association
with the state,
and the rights
of Ethiopians subject
to its jurisdiction.
In implementation of
this vision, the
constitution has divided
the country into
nine ethnic states
with the principal
aim of making
each state as
a vehicle for
aggregating and expressing
the political, cultural
and linguistic identity
of the country’s
major ethnic groups.
The animating idea
behind this constitutional edifice
is the desire
to foster the
emergence of ethnic
groups as distinct
polities, i.e. “nation
states “of homogeneous
ethnicity. Lest there
be any lingering
doubt about this
intention, Article 39
dispels the doubt
and undergirds this
goal by proclaiming
the unconditional of
right of ethnic
groups to secession.
In addition, to
forestall any attempt
at revision of
the Article, the
Constitution ensures its
continued effectiveness by requiring the
consent of ALL
states before any
amendment to this
provision can be
attempted. This essentially
means that every
state, even the
tiny state of
Harari has veto
power to thwart
any revision. As
far as I know, no
democratic constitution has
ever gone down
this road and
certainly not as
far.
The Evils
of Ethnic Constitutionalism
Instability is
the antithesis of
constitutionalism. A wellconsidered and
legitimate constitution should
provide a structure
of political action,
a set of
institutions within which
political conflict can
be resolved through
political processes that
are accepted as
legitimate by the
citizenry. Moreover, such
a constitution should
contain effective guarantees
for the protection
of individual and
minority rights.
Ethiopia’s constitution
falls woefully short
of these requirements.
Far from providing
a framework for
resolving conflict and
protecting minority rights,
the constitution instead
essentially mirrors the
very configuration of
ethnic conflict and
division that it
ostensibly seeks to
resolve. Said differently,
the constitution provides
a framework for
the polarization, not
the moderation, of
contesting ethnic elites
and organized polities
by devolving political
power to majority
ethnic groups and
encouraging them to
form political parties
to represent their
particularistic interests. At
the present time,
the TPLF, like
the erstwhile Communist
Party of the
Soviet Union and
the Communist League
of Yugoslavia, seeks
to maintain national
unity through the
tight control it
maintains over its
ethnic affiliates. The
false sense of
security that this
political modus vivendi
does seem to
offer, however, belies
the underlying reality
of ill will and
resentment the party’s ethnic
partners feel toward
their overlords. It
would be the
height of naiveté’ to
entertain the belief
that the various
ethnicbased
political formations inside and
outside government (with a
few possible exceptions)
are committed to
the current lopsided
political arrangement which
unquestionably serves and
benefits the elites
of one ethnic
group.
It is
to be expected,
therefore, that the
leaders of the
subservient components of
the federation are
biding their time.
They will raise
their heads, assert
themselves, and challenge
the ruling power
over some question
of importance to
the challenger when
the circumstances appear
propitious. This is
likely to occur
when the local
government feels that
it has substantial
support among its
“own” population to
challenge action by
the center as
illegitimate or when
it perceives that
the center as
no longer capable
of enforcing its
rule. The existence
of independent ethnic
governments will serve
as a means
for collating and
articulating ethnic demands
and grievances against
the central government
or to urge
action toward gaining
independent statehood. Under
either scenario, what
begins as a
conflict of interest,
over economic questions
such as land
ownership, for example,
may be turned
into a conflict
of principle over
the legitimacy of
the federation itself,
thus setting the
stage for the
breakdown of the
federal state into
a war among
its components. Such
is the kind
of conflict the
constitution at bottom
configures but provides
next to nothing
to ensure political
legitimacy and stability.
The TPLF
constitution is configurative
of ethnic conflict
in another way
and for that
reason can never
be a recipe
for social peace
or governmental stability.
The sole rationale
and impetus for
the constitution is
the right of
ethnic majorities to selfdetermination each
with its “own” territory
and government. Ethnic
constitutionalism is the
hallmark of such
a form of
state: a constitutional and
legal structure that
privileges the members
of the ethnically
defined nation over
the other residents
of a particular
state. It thus
envisions government of
one kind of
people, by that
kind of people,
for that kind
of people, whose
sovereignty must be
protected against perceived
encroachments form all
others. Such a
system of government
institutionalizes ethnic division
between those who
are members of
the sovereign nation
and those who
are not. As
our experience to
date demonstrates, the
chief motive for
“national liberation” is
not really to
free oneself from
domination or perceived
domination but rather
to acquire the
means to dominate
and mistreat others.
Thus those who
are relegated to
minority status in
an enclave state
may be citizens of
the country but
may not aspire
to equality. Under
these circumstances, the
very premise of
the polity may
be seen as
an inversion of
Affirmative Action as
practiced in the
United States: ethnic
constitutionalism institutionalizes invidious
discrimination and negative
action against minorities,
which the constitution
has simply defined
out of the
body politic because
they are not
considered natives of the regions
in which they
reside. Constitutionally defining
out a targeted
population in this
way is a serious matter
especially where the
target group has
roots in the
territory that go
back generations, even
centuries, because it
deprives the excluded
group of their
fundamental rights to
nondiscrimination and equality.
No group
of people will
willingly accept relegation
to secondclass status
and exclusion. On the contrary,
ethnic minorities (and
their coethnics elsewhere) are
more likely to
be encouraged to
oppose the majoritarian
government which defines
them as social
and political outcasts
and tyrannizes them.
Moreover, ethnic constitutionalism necessarily
gives rise to
two very divergent
and conflicting visions
of citizenship: national
and ethnic. As
the experiences of
Yugoslavia and the exSoviet Union
have shown, however,
rival citizenships of
this kind are
a prolific source
of social conflict
and can hardly
coexist at least
not for a long time
in the same
political space. These
experiences suggest that
ethnic minded individuals
are far more
willing to exchange
their national citizenship
for ethnic citizenship
(recall Jawar’s outburst
of “I am
first an Oromo”
on Al Jazeera)
and are willing
to kill or
die for their
ethnic group. Recall
also that pride
in and loyalty
to the ethnic
group are salient
attributes of ethnic
nationalism. The late
Meles Zenawi captured
this sentiment when
he said to
the country” I
am proud to
be born a
Tigrayan, the Golden
people of Ethiopia.”
Furthermore, they illustrate
that when the
two kinds of
nationalism compete, countrywide
nationalism is likely
to be the
loser because it
lacks the emotional
force that ethnic
citizenship can so
easily muster. We
all know from
our own recent
history that the
struggle between these
forms of citizenship
has often resulted
in disastrous civil
wars, economic dislocations,
and, more seriously,
in ethnic cleansing.
Thus, from
a human rights
perspective ethnic constitutionalism is
inherently problematic. Even
leaving aside for
a moment ethnic
cleansing and genocide ominous systemic
risks which Gura
Ferda and BeniShangul have
exposed ethnic
constitutionalism is a
negation of the
various internationally recognized
human rights the
country has solemnly
covenanted to uphold.
To begin with,
in so far
as ethnic constitutionalism empowers
a particular ethnic
group to control
a subunit of
the federation, such
a group will
invariably frame and
enforce rules and
practices calculated to
privilege its members
and to subordinate
socalled
outsiders. Such discrimination violates,
for example, the
International Covenant on
the Elimination of
All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, which
specifically outlaws” any
distinction, exclusion, restriction
or preference based
on … ethnic
origin which has
the purpose or
effect of nullifying
or impairing… the
enjoyment or exercise,
on equal footing,
of human rights
and fundamental freedoms
in the political,
economic, social, cultural
or any other
field of public
life.” Ditto for
Article 25 of
the Ethiopian Constitution. Notwithstanding these
provisions, ethnic discrimination is
a daily dirge
heard among wide
sections of Ethiopian
society. Space does
not allow me
to go into
this point in
greater detail. Suffice
it point out
that recruitment to
the civil service,
the police and
other branches of the government
is disproportionately from
either the ethnic
group controlling the
center or the
ethnic groups that
control the sub-‐states.
Ethnic constitutionalism also
violates the guarantee
of equal rights
to political participation
as mandated by
international human rights
law. The International
Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,
for example, recognizes
the right of
every citizen to
“take part in
the conduct of
public affairs”, the
right to vote
and be elected
in periodic elections,
and the “right
to have access
on general terms
of equality, to
public service in
his country.” Yet,
ethnic federalism nullifies
these guarantees. In
the State of
BeniShangulGumuz, for
example, a proclamation
passed in 2007
has allocated 55%
of the seats
of city councils
in the state
to ethnic groups
considered indigenous (i.e.,
Gumuz, Shinasha, Komo
and Mao). The
rest of the
population of the
state are considered
outsiders and secondclass citizens
even though they
together constitute more
than 40 %
of the state’s population.
Similarly, in the
state of Oromia
another proclamation provides
that in the socalled First
and Second Class
Cities, if the
number of Oromos
residing in these
cities are fewer
in number than
the rest of the resident
population, then 50% of the
Council seats will
be reserved for
them along with
an additional 20%
for Oromos living
in the surrounding
rural areas. Under
both these laws,
Ethiopian citizens who
are considered nonnative to
these areas are
purposely relegated to
minority status.
In the
face of such
discrimination and exclusion,
it is no
wonder that citizens
are reluctant to
exercise their right
under international human
rights law to
move freely in
the country and
reside wherever they
choose to. To
be sure the
Ethiopian constitution guarantees
this right as
well but its
practical implementation is
another matter altogether.
Because employment opportunities, political
power, rights of
political participation and
access to economic
and business opportunities
all depend on
belonging to the
“right” ethnic group,
those that do
not belong have
no incentive to
move into regions
controlled by such
group, especially now
when the political
atmosphere has been
polluted by ethnic
cleansing.
More worrisome
violations of the
foregoing rights are
the impending danger
of ethnic cleansing
and genocide. This
is no exaggeration.
Consider: If ethnic
cleansing is already
here, can genocide
be far behind?
My fear is
that it cannot
be. I base
this fear on
the simple logic
of the ethnic
fundamentalist ideology the
Ethiopian constitution has
embraced. As noted,
the driving ideology
of ethnic nationalism
is rooted in
the notion of
ethnic homogeneity, which
inevitably leads to
feelings of separateness
and a sense
of exclusive ownership
of a particular
homeland. Ethnic nationalists
have two means
to accomplish ethnic
homogeneity and ensure
that the ethnic
homeland remains in
the hands of
sons of the
soil: ethnic cleansing
and genocide. The
first has raised
its ugly head
several times already
in several regions
of the country.
If allowed to
take its natural
course this evil
is likely to
escalate and lead
sooner or later
to a campaign
of genocide. Drawing
ethnic boundaries on
mixed populations as
has been done
in Ethiopia is
often a recipe
for the commission
of such crimes.
The break-‐ up
of a common
state is the
other major circumstance
which often leads
to the same
result.
This is
a risk that
we can ignore
at our own
peril.
What to
do?
What must
Ethiopians who care
about the welfare
of their compatriots
and the unity
of their country
do to reverse
the political tendencies
that encourage these
evils? Figuring out
the answer to
this question is
the hardest part.
Nonetheless, let me offer
a few thoughts
in this vein.
I believe that
the first and
most important lesson
we can glean
from our political
history of the
past 40 years
is to recognize
the wrong-‐headed and
flawed manner in
which the socalled “national question” was
formulated and propounded.
Many of us
considered this foreigninspired formula
as the panacea
for our problems
of ethnic inequality
without ever bothering
to undertake seriously
a sober study
of our own
history and political
situation. Unlike the exSoviet Union
and Yugoslavia which
were a patchwork
of previously independent
national communities, Ethiopia’s historical
trajectory was one
of organic growth
around a common
nucleus. We all
know that before
the Woyane came
to power, there
was no notion
of an Amhara
or Oromo community
each with its
own defined region.
Contrast that with Ukraine, Georgia
or Russia with
their defined boundaries
even in Czarist
times. It is
the failure to
appreciate this crucial
distinction that has
led us to
repeat the canard
that “nations, nationalities
and peoples” have the right
to secession. But
does the seceding
unit have title
to the territory
it seeks to
take with it?
Has the population
that now inhabits
a specific territory
always controlled such
territory? Raising these
questions is enough to
indicate the answer:
we must reverse
course and cleanse
our politics of
ethnonationalist
debris.
A related
mistake concerns the
fact that little
or no thought
was given to
the need to
preserve Ethiopia and Ethiopiawinnet. To
the contrary, the
task of defending
the danger facing
these values was
left to the
government of the
day, both in
the imperial period
as well as
under the military
regime. Those faint
voices which raised
concerns regarding the
negative consequences of
overemphasizing the national
question to the
detriment of the
unity of the
country were castigated
as “chauvinists” and “neftegnas.” The
ruling government and
some ethno-nationalists in
the camp of the opposition
continue to find
these labels serviceable
even to this
day. Sadly the
overwhelming majority of
us was cowed and
continues to be
so today by these
epithets and proved
to be bystanders
as the country
hurtled down a
dangerous path of
national destruction.
It is
essential that we
rectified this mistake
and repaired the
damage by standing
up forcefully for
Ethiopia’s survival as a country
and the right
of all our
people to live
and work anywhere
in the country
and to be
treated as equal
citizens under law.
We can do
that only when
we come together
by bridging minor
political and personal
differences and when
we no longer
allow ethnic movements
to dominate the
country’s politics. After
all, the two
main social problems
of the country an
inequitable land tenure
system and ethnic
inequality, which might
have served to
justify the ethnic
movements of the
1970s and 1980s
do no longer
justify ethnic separatism.
Whether they do
or not, however,
the most urgent
and central task
of all who
believe in Ethiopiawinnet is the need
to build a
powerful constituency to
uphold the rights
of Ethiopia as
a country and
the equal treatment
of its citizens.
Unlike in the
past, this task
cannot be left
to the government
of the day.
This is what
makes the task
doubly urgent and
overwhelming.
It is
also important to
recognize that all
the talk by
all and sundry
individuals and political
parties alike about democracy,
human rights and
the rule of
law is empty
sloganeering unless Ethiopia
and Ethiopiawinnet are
preserved. Indeed a
major precondition on
the road to
the realization of
these values is
national unity and
territorial integrity. This
point is so
basic and so
obvious it needs
little or no
elaboration.
Finally, it
must be pointed
out that Ethiopia
and Ethiopiawinnet are
unlikely to endure
so long as
the constitution, which
is the source
of many of
the problems briefly
identified, is either
scrapped or greatly
revised to do
away with the
pernicious notion of
ethnic homelands. This
is not the
place to go
into the details
of constitution making or
revising. One idea
that must occupy
a prominent place
in such an
effort, however, would
be to guarantee
that all inhabitants
of a region,
however defined, shall
be entitled to
all the privileges
and rights enumerated
in the constitution
on an equal
and nondiscriminatory basis.
By Alemante G.
Selassie1
——————————————————————————
1. The
author is Professor
Emeritus of Law
at the College
of William &
Mary in Williamsburg,
VA (USA). This
blog is an
abridged version of
a presentation on
the same subject
that was given
on July 4,
2013 at the
public forum organized
by Ethiopiawinnet in
Washington, DC (USA).
He may be
contacted at: agsela@wm.edu.
