Ethnicity,
Violence and Multi-party Democracy in Africa since 1989
Tata
Simon Ngenge
History
Department, University of Yaounde I
INTRODUCTION
The African continent is made up of multi-ethnic groups. These ethnic groups lived and interacted peacefully with each other through marriage and trade. The European partition of
Effects of European Partition
African ethnic groups since 1884
The conclusions of the Berlin West Africa Conference gave the European imperial powers the green Iight to effectively partition
Further balkanization, which arose routinely from the mere location
of artificial boundaries, set in motion by different states, further pulled
apart partitioned ethnic groups. These processes have tended to make the
partitioned ethnic groups to look in different political, economic and social
directions because of the distinct policies which the various states pursued in
matters of trade and currency, politics and administration, ideology and
education (Asiwaju, 1976).
By setting up administrative structures in the various
nation-states, ethnic groups were further partitioned. Thus, ethnic conflicts
emerged as far back as the colonial period when the colonial administration
favoured particular ethnic groups over others. Such favoritism did rot have a
scientific justification as in Rwanda .
The colonial policy of divide-and-rule by investing administrative powers into
the hands of minority ethnic group sowed seeds of ethnic conflicts in Africa . Ethnicity thus became a
political tool that regimes used to govern and stay in power. Although during
the fight for decolonisation, ethnic groups were mobilised by nationalists for
the Liberation struggle, which, according to Frantz Fanon (1964), had a legal
justification, these ethnic affiliations remained a destructive element to
national integration and development after decolonisation. The immediate
post-colonial governments ran into this syndrome leading to the establishment
of the worse dictatorships, the world had ever witnessed: Siad Barre of Somalia
and Mobuto of Zaire, to mention a few.
The emergence of multiparty democracy
and ethnic violence
The emergence of multiparty democracy after decades of one-party
dictatorship was unanimously welcomed. The democratic forces emerged when the
continent was plagued by the economic recession. Dictatorial governments and
bad governance were singled out as the remote causes of the said recession. The
end of the CoId War, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the events in Eastern Europe motivated the
middle class in Africa to call for democratically elected governments. Following this wind
of change which was a deadly political influenza to the dictators, ethnic
conflicts suddenly came to the fore. Thus, the new and emerging issues took on
an increasing ethnic character, because political leaders found it relatively
easy to mobilize the masses by stimulating a sense of collective identity
(Carment, 1994). The appeals of new political leaders were crucial in the
ousting of the entrenched elite (Seidman, 1992). Never in the history of the
continent had people wielded such extensive power above ethnic affinities in
the quest for liberalisation and democratisation: upbraiding the state and
mandating to destroy itself; but with a humanising motive, the revolutionary
competence. They learnt to revolt against the absolute inclinations of their
leaders. The universal quest for good governance through democratically elected
leaders was a pointer to the revolutionary competence of the new man (Nwankwo,
1992). The advocacy for democratisation was the concern of all the
underprivileged people, irrespective of race or ethnic group. In some
countries, the rallying cry of multiparty democracy culminated in something
other than effective pluralism; which led to an upsurge in rampant ethnic
pluralism, elite replacement or the shattering of fragile democratic
institutions. With the emergence of democratisation, political scientists have
projected that with the current geopolitical "map", there is a high
potential degree for ethnic politics to become even more pervasive (Carment,
ibid). The economic crisis, which they attribute to bad governance, did affect
the masses without exception. The application of the World Bank Structural
Adjustment Program (SAP) led to mass retrenchments and company shut-downs that
led to redundancy, salary cuts, devaluation and inflation, frustration and a
rise in crime (Heraut and Adesanmi, 1997). The calls of emerging new political
leaders to overthrow dictatorial governments democratically ran across ethnic
barriers and national frontiers.
The wealth of the various countries was in the hands of the ruling class, who through corruption had used the army, police and judiciary to stay in power. The new political leaders who emerged in the 1990s, thus, found their disciples and followers mostly in urban centres that were the worse hit by the economic crisis than the rural areas. The mass mobilisation to undo tyranny in the entire continent did net evoke ethnic sentiments, but was a rallying force to undo the evil that had plagued the people the Marxist perspective of class struggle.
In several countries of Africa , the wind of change was rather abrupt and the rulers were not
adequately prepared to adopt wider popular political participation. But as
Susungi (1992) observed, the virus was able to breed and multiply faster because
the political conditions were ripe and waiting. Those who held political power
perceived opposing views as treacherous and treasonable. To them,
democratisation meant the beginning of social conflicts, the rediscovery of
ethnicity, migration and displacement.
They could not envisage that despotic regimes like any form of
matter, is destined to subserve the cyclical law of history. To maintain
themselves in power; these rulers terrorised, harassed and intimidated the
powerless. In some cases, real and imaginary political opponents were
eliminated to halt the democratisation process. Invariably, repressive and
alienating violence therefore became politicised. The case of Rwanda , Burundi ,
the Congos , Sudan , Liberia , Sierra
Leone and Kenya are
textbook examples of this trend (Osaghae, 1995).
The emergence of multiparty politics in Africa , therefore, surfaced
with serious political power struggles between stakeholders. During this epoch,
power brokers preyed on their ethnic background to drum up political gains. At
the heart of the matter lies the deeply engrained pattern of social inequality
and exclusion within African societies. This refers not only to the problem of
widespread poverty, but to the overall syndrome of systematic exclusion from
Iivelihood resources (jobs, security, freedom, land), from public welfare
schemes, from political participation and, moreso, from the state as a
collective social and cultural construct. This syndrome is based on various
combinations of class and ethnic divisions and is further complicated by the
persistent significance of potential links that can determine whether one is
'in' or 'out' in terms of effective citizenship.
The violent ethnic conflicts witnessed in IleIfe, Western Nigeria between the Modakeke of Ogun State and IjuIta of Ondo State in April 1991 and March 1977, in Kenya between the Kikuyus and the people of Migori District of Nyanza Province in 1997, the civil wars in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola, the Congos, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda, just to cite a few; are societal crises emanating from the politicisation and misuse of ethnic identities and disparities mostly by those in possession of military and political power (Nyong'o, 1993; Dieuf, 1995).
Multiparty Politics and Ethnicity
In 1990, as the demand for multiparty democracy intensified, most of
those in power decided to advocate ethnicity for political mileage. This was
purely to drum up support for their personal interest, because multiparty
democratic systems are on the contrary supposed to resolve ethnic animosities
and tribalism. The liberalization of the political front in several African
countries like Kenya , Burundi , Rwanda ; Sierra
Leone and the Congos
did not respond to the above theoretical perceptions.
Political activity since 1990 shows that when multiparty politics
was introduced, political parties tended to develop along ethnic lines; in
Kenya, for example, the ruling Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) led by Arab
Moi became the party of the Kalenjins and the Minority tribes, Mr. Ogiga Odinga
led the FORD Kenya party associated with the Luo/Nyanza tribes and Mr Nwai
Kibaki and Mr Kenneth Matiba led the two Kikuyu political parties the
Democratic party (DP) and FORD Asili party. In Cameroon ,
since the November 1990 bill on Rights and Freedoms was promulgated, the number
of political parties in Cameroon as of April 1999 stood at 161. It should be recalled that the
population of Cameroon as of 1995 stood at 12.9 millions (Jeune Afrique Economie Hors
series Août 1995). At this rate of legalizing political parties, it is
estimated by politically minded Cameroonians that by the year 2000 the number
of political parties will be around 200. In this case, the 200 parties
correspond to the 200 ethnic groups in Cameroon .
In Cameroon therefore, the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic
Movement (CPDM) of Mr Biya became the Beti party; the Social Democratic Front
(SDF) led by Ni John Fru Ndi was personified as the Anglo-Bami Party; the Union
des Populations (UPC) Bassa; Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU) led by Dr Adamu
Ndam Njoya, Bamoun; National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP) led by
Maigari Bello Bouba Hausa/Fulani party of the Grand North (Kontchou Kouemegni,
in interview, xxxx 1993), to cite a few.
However, this syndrome of running political parties on ethnic lines
is more common in former French colonies of Sub-Saharan Africa. There is no
country in this French community that has less than 20 legalized political
parties. The Republic of Chad with a population of 6.2 million, as of June 1999, had 60 legalised
political parties. By legalizing political parties on ethnic bases, African
dictators had, in no small way, weakened the opposition and blocked the
processes of democratization. In francophone Africa , the tacit
transformation of political parties into ethnic associations by those in power
had greatly antagonised ethnic groups as the unprivileged ethnic groups are
relegated to the back and perceived as the enemies of the state. The
ethnicization of political parties in most countries had disintegrated the
opposition. This has been further aggravated by the absorption of fragile
parties into the presidential majority. This phenomenon marks a gradual return
to the one-party system in shipskin of multiparty democracy. By politicising
ethnicity to fight democracy, African dictators have legalised tribalism and
killed efficiency. Ethnic nationalism, suppressed during the one-party system,
resurfaced and entered all fabrics of the society. In Cameroon ,
politicisation of ethnicity to block democracy led to the categorization of
Cameroonians into "les autochtones" (indegenes) and
"allogènes" (settlers). Before the 1997 presidential elections, this
sparked a wave of ethnic violence between the indegenes of the South West Province
supporters of CPDM and settlers from the North West
presumed to be supporters of the SDF. The North Westerners who were now
considered as settlers in their own country were stigmatised as 'come no
go". In Kumba, Chief Mukete, supported by the administration, instituted
residence permits; North Westerners had to obtain a residence permit before
living in that part of the country and had no right to vote. This was ethnicity
at work and it all happened under the watchful eyes of the army, police and the
judiciary that had become auxiliary organs of the ruling CPDM party.
CONCLUSION
The blockage of multiparty democracy
The use of ethnicity to fight multiparty politics by African
dictators has had far-reaching effects on individuals and the nation. In the
globalisation world, multiparty democracy must go across ethnic and linguistic
barriers. We cannot talk of regional integration and eventual African
integration by the year 2035, if national interests do not go above ethnic
interests. Ethnicisation has killed thought and reason, dynamism and
efficiency, and therefore patriotism. It has destroyed state cohesion and
promoted tribalism. On the other hand, the study of ethnicity and multiparty
politics put researchers in a difficult position to explain the prevailing
peaceful co-existence in multi-ethnic Tanzania ,
while mono-ethnic Somalia is being torn apart by interclan warfare. These are just some of
the challenging questions confronting social scientists and theoreticians, as
pertains to the analysis of ethnicity, multiparty democracy and good
governance. The entire continent witnessed the dangers of ethnic politicisation
in Rwanda and Burundi and any dictator that, instead of democratisation, advocates ethnic
malaise is setting that nation on a destructive path.
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